Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. We present a new generalization of the VC dimension to multivalued collections of functions, which encompasses the classical VC dimension, Natarajan dimension, and Steele dimension. We present a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and harness this VC machinery to establish inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms. Our results essentially unify all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful algorithms. * It is highly recommended to prefer the full version of this paper that can be found on the authors' webpages and on arXiv.
INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies computational environments in which the input to the algorithm is provided by self-interested, strategic, parties, e.g., combinatorial auctions-the now paradigmatic problem of AMD: m items 1, . . . , m are being sold to n bidders 1, . . . , n. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2 [m] → R, which specifies i's "maximum willingness to pay" for every subset ("bundle") of items S ⊆ [m]. The objective is to maximize social welfare, that is, to partition the items between the bidders in such a way that the "social welfare" Σivi(Si) is maximized, where Si is the bundle assigned to bidder i. A prominent line of research in AMD is exploring the complex interplay between three natural desiderata: (1) computational efficiency; (2) truthfulness, i.e., incentivizing bidders to reveal their actual valuations to the mechanism; and (3) approximation guarantees.
Past studies expose inherent tensions between these desiderata and establish large gaps between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms in various environments, including combinatorial auctions [10, 14, 26] -the paradigmatic setting of AMD. Yet, despite much effort along these lines, long-standing questions remain wide open, including the "holy grail" [16] : designing a deterministic truthful mechanism for general combinatorial auctions that matches the approximation guarantee of the best non-truthful algorithm (or prove that no such mechanism exists). Beyond the contribution of research along these lines to AMD, it also yielded ideas and insights that are of broader interest. One example is the interesting connection between the VC dimension and optimization over partial domains, presented in [26] . Papadimitriou et al. [26] showed how classical VC machinery (namely, the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [27, 28] ) can be used to prove inapproxiability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms in the context of combinatorial public projects. Subsequent work further developed this idea in the combinatorial public projects setting [26, 6] and in the combinatorial auctions setting [17, 7, 5, 21] .
While combinatorial public projectsnaturally lend themselves to standard VC lower bounding techniques, other environments pose a more a complex challenge. [17, 7, 5, 21] showed that sophisticated adaptations of existing VC machinery, namely the Sauer-Shelah Lemma, can yield inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions in a specific setting: VCG-based mechanisms for "capped-additive valuations". However, as combinatorial auctions deal with partitions of a universe (as opposed to subsets), it is not clear how standard VC machinery can, in general, be applied to other auction contexts (general truthful mechanisms, other types of valuations, communication complexity,. . . ).
We present a new generalization of the VC dimenstion that is both natural from a combinatorial perspective, and encompasses the classical VC dimension, as well as past generalizations of the VC dimension: the Natarajan dimension [22] and the Steele dimension [29] . While many previously proposed generalizations of the VC dimension [27, 28, 22, 18, 4, 1, 9, 8] are motivated by machine learning applications-proving positive results for classification-our generalization is aimed at establishing negative results in AMD, and is thus of a very different flavour. We prove a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma that generalizes several known bounds [27, 28, 22, 18, 29] and apply it to obtain new inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms and also for simplifying and unifying existing inapproximability results.
Generalizing the VC dimension and Implications for Auctions
Recall the classic Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension [30] .
The prominence of the V C dimension is largely due to the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [27, 28] :
Our generalization of the VC dimension relies on the notion of "shattering to k values": Definition 1.3 (k-shattering). Let H ⊂ Y X and k ≥ 2. We say that A ⊂ X is k-shattered by H, if for every a ∈ A there is a set Ya ⊂ Y of size k such that the following holds: Every function f : A → Y that satisfies f (a) ∈ Ya for all a ∈ A is a restriction of some function in H. That is, ∃h ∈ H s.t. f = h|A.
Putting it differently, for every choice of elements {ya}a∈A such that ya ∈ Ya, there is some h ∈ H such that h(a) = ya for all a ∈ A.
This notion of (k-)shattering differs from past generalizations of shattering to non-binary domains (see, e.g., [7, 17] ). We present the following generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma:
We point out that (1) taking k = |Y | = 2, we get the V C dimension and the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [27, 28] ; (2) for general Y and k = 2 we get Natarajan's dimension [22] and the bound in [18] , which strengthen Natarajan's bound [22] ; and (3) for k = |Y |, we get Steele's dimension and bound [29] . Our proof of Theorem 1.5 (the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma) relies on a careful application of techniques used for proving previous bounds (e.g., [29, 22, 18] ) and appears in Appendix ??.
We now provide an intuitive exposition of the connection between our dimension/bound and combinatorial auctions. We focus, for ease of exposition, on the class of VCG-based, a.k.a. maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms, and on bidders with particularly simple "single-minded" valuations: Each bidder i is only interested in a single bidder-specific bundle of items Ti, and assigns a value of 1 to all sets of items containing Ti and a value of 0 to all other bundles of items. A maximal-in-range mechanism has a fixed, predetermined, "bank of allocations" of the items to the bidders, and for every input (reported valuations) outputs the best allocation in this bank. A trivial MIR mechanism is the mechanism that always allocates all items to the bidder who values them the most, i.e., the MIR mechanism whose bank of allocations consists of the n partitions of the items of the form (∅, . . . , ∅, [m], ∅, . . . , ∅). A simple argument shows that the approximation ratio of this mechanism is min{n, m}. We prove that this naive mechanism is essentially the best VCG-based (MIR) mechanism: no VCG-based mechanism has approximation ratio m 1− for any constant > 0 unless NP⊆P/poly.
Suppose, for point of contradiction, that there exists a computationally-efficient MIR mechanism M with bank of allocations H that has approximation ratio m 1− . Observe that the allocations in H can naturally be regarded as a collection of functions from [m] to [n] ∪ { * }; every allocation A ∈ H is associated with function fA that maps every item in [m] to a bidder in [n], or leaves the item unallocated (mapping it to * ), as in A. We now prove, via a subtle argument that utilizes Theorem 1.5, that there exists a large (polynomial in m) set of bidders X and a large (polynomial in m) set of items Y , such that all partitions of the items in Y between bidders in X appear in H and, in this sense, H shatters the pair (X, Y ). We can now conclude that, as M optimizes exactly over the allocations in H, M can compute the optimal allocation of |X| items to |Y | singleminded bidders-an NP-hard task (this is, in fact, precisely the classical SET-PACKING problem).
While simple, this example illustrates the strength of our VC machinery with respect to past utilizations of VC dimension arguments in the context of combinatorial auctions: (1) H shatters a polynomial number of bidders and a polynomial number of items; and (2) every partition in which all items in X are assigned to bidders in Y appears in H. Observe that shattering a constant number of bidders (e.g., 2 bidders in [5] ) is insufficient, as combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders are, in fact, tractable for a constant number of bidders. Also, if even a single allocation of all items in X to bidders in Y does not appear in H, the reduction from a combinatorial auction with |X| items and |Y | single-minded bidders is no longer possible (as the optimal allocation might simply not be in M 's bank).
Inapproximability Results
Our inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions are summarized in Table 1 . Our results are categorized in three dimensions:
• Representation of the "input". We consider the two standard models for accessing the "input"-the valuation functions-in combinatorial auctions: (1) the computational complexity model, in which valuation functions are succinctly encoded, and mechanisms must run in time that is polynomial in the input length; and (2) the oracle model, in which valuations are treated as black boxes that can only answer a certain type of queries, and complexity is measured in terms of the number of queries. Three types of queries are commonly considered: (i) value queries; (ii) demand queries; and (iii) the communication complexity model, in which oracles can answer any type of query (addressed to a single valuation).
• General deterministic mechanisms vs. VCGbased mechanisms. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme for designing truthful mechanisms is the only universal technique for designing truthful deterministic mechanisms. While a naive application of VCG is often computationally intractable, more clever uses of the VCG scheme provide the best deterministic truthful approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions to date [15, 19] . We present inapproximability results for both general (unrestricted) deterministic mechanisms and for the important subcategory of VCG-based mechanisms
• Classes of valuation functions. Over the past decade, much effort has been invested in bounding the approximability guarantees of truthful mechanisms for different classes of valuation functions of interest, including general valuations [19] , submodular valuations [10, 14] , single-minded valuations [20] , capped additive valuations [5] , and more. We present inapproximability results for several well-studied classes of valuation functions.
We shall now briefly highlight some of the new results in Table 1 :
Inapproximability for general deterministic mechanisms. We prove that no computationally-efficient and truthful mechanism for general valuations can (asymptotically) outperform the trivial m-approximation mechanism that bundles all items together and assigns them to the bidder who values them most (in a 2nd-price auction). Specifically, for any choice of constant > 0, there exists a class of succinctly-described valuation functions such that (1) a nontruthful computationally-efficient algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of m for this class ; but (2) no computationallyefficient and truthful algorithm (mechanism) can obtain an O(m 1− )-approximation unless NP ⊆ P/poly. Our proof of this separation gap between truthful and non-truthful algorithms relies on the "direct hardness approach" [10] combined with a careful application of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma.
Results for VCG-based mechanisms. We present several new inapproximability results for VCG-based mechanisms. Our proofs of these results rely on lower bounding the Steele dimension (yet another special case of our generalization). Our results establish, in particular (1) that the best deterministic approximation ratio for general valuations is
, obtained via a simple VCG mechanism [19] , is essentially tight; (2) a m 1 3 lower bound for submodular valuations in the communication complexity model, improving upon the m 1 6 -inapproximability result of Dobzinski and Nisan [12] , obtained via a short and elegant proof that utilizes the Natarajan dimension (another special case of our generalized VC dimension); (3) that no VCG-based mechanism can match the approximation guarantees of truthful non-VCG mechanisms in combinatorial auctions with singleminded bidders [20] and in combinatorial auctions with multiple duplicates of each item [3] .
Unifying all inapproximability results for deterministic mechanisms. We show that essentially all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms in the combinatorial auctions setting (to date) can be proved in our generalized VC dimension framework. Inapproximability results that fit in our framework include the inapproximability results for (1) submodular valuations in the value queries model [10] ; (2) submodular valuations in the computational complexity model [14] ; and (3) capped additive valuations [5] . We believe that, in this sense, our new approach marks the borderline of the state of the art and that further progress along these lines must thus entail inherently new ideas.
Organization
We discuss the connections between Theorem 1.5 and partitions in Section 2. We then explain how our techniques can be applied to prove inapproximability results for VCGbased and unrestricted truthful deterministic mechanisms in Section 3 and Section 4, resprectively. See Appendix for the proof of Theorem 1.5, background on mechanism design and combinatorial auctions (Section ??) and a detailed exposition of our inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms (Sections ??-??).
SHATTERING VS. APPROXIMATION
We now discuss the connections between Theorem 1.5 (the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma) and so called "approximatepartitions". We consider collections H of allocations of an item set X to a set of indices Y . We will show that if H (even very loosely) in some sense approximates the collection of all partitions, then there are large subsets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y for which all the partitions of items in S to indices in A belong to H.
We first define the notions of shattering by collections of allocations (and in particular we accommodate scenarios that involve duplicate elements). Then, we define two approximation notions for collections of allocations, and prove shattering results.
Shattering Allocations
We extend the notion of shattering to allocations, which are more natural than functions in the context of combinatorial auctions. Let X be a set of items and Y a set of indices. An allocation is a pairwise disjoint collection {Sy}y∈Y of subsets of X. If ∪y∈Y Sy = X, we say that the allocation is a partition. We denote the collection of all allocations of X to the indices Y by P (X, Y ). The collection of allocations naturally corresponds to the collection of functions f : X → Y ∪ { * } (here, f −1 ( * ) is the set of items that were not allocated to any index). We will freely alternate between these two representations. We say that a collection H of allocations shatters a pair of sets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y if all partitions of S to indices in A are induced by allocations from H. Namely,
be a collection of allocations. We say that a pair of subsets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y is shattered if A S ⊂ H|S.
We wish to accommodate scenarios in which each item have d (identical) copies. To this end we define:
Note that 1-duplicate allocation is just a simple allocation. We denote by P d (X, Y ) the set of all d-duplicate allocations. As with standard allocations, we say that a collection H of d-duplicate allocations shatters a pair of sets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y if every partition of S to the indices A is induced by H. Namely, we let H|S,A := {f : S → A|∃{Sy}y∈Y ∈ H ∀y ∈ A, f −1 (y) = Sy ∩ S}, and define:
We will also use the notion of shattering of a single index. Note that if a pair S ⊂ X, A ⊂ Y is shattered then, for every a ∈ A, the pair S, a is shattered.
Approximate Containment
Let X be a set of m items and Y a set of n indices. Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict our attention to the case that the number of indices, n, is m 1− 3 4 . We assume also that m In addition to the random partition, consider now a subset A ⊂ Y of k indices, chosen uniformly at random and independently from {Ty}y∈Y . Since k indices must be covered (i.e. there is an allocation in H such that the sets corresponding to these indices contain the sets sampled to these indices), the probability that all indices in A (over the choice of both A and {Ty}y∈Y ) are covered is ≥ 1 ( n k )
Hence, there exists a (fixed) set A of k indices which are covered w.p. ≥ m −k when their corresponding sets are sampled at random (by the above distribution). By conditioning on the set which is the union of the sets corresponding to the indices in A, it follows that there exists a set S ⊂ X with |S| = k · m 3 4 = m such that if a function f : S → A is sampled uniformly at random among all functions with ∀i, j ∈ A, |f −1 (i)| = |f −1 (j)|, then w.p. ≥ m −k , it holds that f ∈ HS,A.
It follows that |HS,A| ≥ k m · m −k · m − k (the term m − k is a lower bound on the probability that a uniformly chosen function from S to A will satisfy ∀i, j ∈ A, |f −1 (i)| = |f −1 (j)|).
By Theorem 1.5, be have that |HS,A| ≤ (k−1) m m Dim k (H S,A ) . It follows that
The last inequality is correct for large k since ln(1 + x) = x+o(x). Taking logarithms we conclude that Dim k (HS,A) = Ω(m 3 4 ).
Approximate Intersection
Let X be a set of m items and Y a set of n indices. 
We will use the following lemma from [7] (their lemma 5). 
log 2 (m) such that all the subsets {Ya}a∈S are the same and equal to some A ∈ Y k . This shows that the pair (S, A) is shattered.
INAPPROXIMABILITY FOR VCG-BASED MECHANISMS
We now show how our VC dimension arguments can be applied lower bound the approximability of VCG-based mechanisms. Consider the classical combinatorial auction setting: m items 1, . . . , m, are sold to n bidders 1, . . . , n, and each bidder i has a private valuation function over bundles of items vi : 2 [m] → R. The objective is to partition the items between the bidders so as to maximize Σivi(Si), where Si is the bundle assigned to bidder i. A more general setting is that of a combinatorial auction with duplicates, in which d identical units of each item are available but each bidder desires at most 1 unit of each item. The mechanism can now output a d-duplicate allocation, i.e., a collection S = {Si} i∈[n] of subsets of [m] such that each x ∈ [m] belongs to at most d of these subsets.
A VCG-based, aka maximal-in-range (=MIR), mechanism has fixed bank of allocations H ⊂ P d ([m], [n]) such that the output of M for every n-tuple of valuation function v1, . . . , vn is an allocation S that maximizes n i=1 vi(Si) over all allocations S ∈ H. Charging VCG prices from the bidders ensures that such mechanisms are truthful.
We lower bound the approximability of MIR mechanisms in two steps: (1) using the machinery developed in the previous section to show that a "good" approximation ratio implies shattering of a large number of bidders and items by H; and (2) embedding a hard (e.g., NP-hardness, under the Unique Games Conjecture, and communication complexity) problem in this shattered domain.
Step I: Shattering a large number of bidders and items (the VC step). Consider the following two of the simplest classes of valuation functions: Intuitively, these valuations correspond to the containment and the intersection properties defined in the previous section. Shattering is thus immediately guaranteed by the following corollaries of Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 2.8, respectively: Clearly, these corollaries assert that if mechanism M obtains a suitable approximation ratio w.r.t. to any collection of valuations F that contains one of these two basic valuation classes, the (appropriate) shattering bound holds.
Step II: Reducing from a hard problem. As the mechanisms considered are MIR, the mechanism can optimize exactly over the shattered set of bidders and items-an intractable task for many classes of valuations. We leverage this to prove both computational complexity and communication complexity results. We next illustrate this idea in specific contexts. See our results in the appendix for other classes of valuation functions. We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3. No efficient MIR mechanism has approximation ratio m 1− for any constant > 0 w.r.t. singleminded valuations, unless NP⊆ P/poly. The approximation ratio implies that there must be some T ∈ H such that n ≤ m 1− · |{i|Si ⊂ Ti}| . Therefore, by corollary 3.1, there is a shattered pair B ⊂ [n], X ⊂ [m] of sizes m /4 , Ω(m 3 /4 ).
We will show computational hardness by a reduction from the k-packing promise problem. In this problem, the input consists of r sets S1, ...., Sr ⊂ U and an integer C > 0, and the goal is to distinguish between the following two options:
• Positive: There are C sets in S1, ...., Sn that are pairwise disjoint.
• Negative: For every collection F of C sets out of S1, ...., Sn, there is some x ∈ U that is covered by k sets of F.
Observe that setting k = 2 yields the famous "SET PACK-ING" problem, which is known to be NP-hard. We shall make use of the fact that assuming UGC, this problem is NP-hard for every constant k. (The proof, based on [2] , can be found in the appendix). The reduction is given by taking k = d + 1, and using the shattered X set as the universe U : Given S1, ..., S m /4 ⊂ X and an integer C > 0, suppose that each bidder i ∈ B desires Si, and all bidders not in B have the zero valuation. Now, in the "YES" cases, since there is a collection of C pairwise disjoint subsets from S1, ..., S m /4 , and since the pair X, B is shattered and M is MIR, the social welfare, i vi(Si), will be at least C. On the other hand, in the "NO" cases, it is impossible to satisfy C bidders by any d-duplicate allocation, and therefore, the social welfare will be less that C.
We prove the analogue of Theorem 3.4 in the communication complexity model. We first define multi-minded valuations (0/1), which are are all valuations v : 2 [m] → {0, 1}.
Theorem 3.5. For every constant d and > 0, any VCGbased mechanism for combinatorial auctions with d-duplicates that obtains an approximation ratio of m 1− w.r.t. multiminded valuations must use exponential communication.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.5 involves a reduction from the communication approximate disjointness problem and appears in Appendix ??.
INAPPROXIMABILITY FOR GENERAL MECHANISMS
We next describe our approach to proving inapproximability results for unrestricted deterministic mechanisms. We illustrate these ideas by outlining the proof of a new separation gap between truthful and nontruthful deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general valuations (see full proof in Appendix ??). Our proof applies the "direct hardness approach", introduced by Dobzinsky [10] together with the VC dimension arguments.
We first define the specific valuation class that we will consider.
). For k = k(m) we denote that class of k-local valuations by k − local. The corresponding bidding language will be circuits.
Theorem 4.2. For any > 0,
• Unless N P ⊆ P/poly, no efficient truthful mechanism has an approximation ratio of m 1− w.r.t. m -local valuations.
• There is an efficient non-truthful mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2k w.r.t. k-local valuations. Moreover, the auctioneer communicates with the bidders only trough value queries.
We start by describing the efficient non-truthful mechanism. Next, we prove the second part of theorem 4.2. We begin by defining a class of valuations: These valuations will serve us in showing existence of a big menu for one of the bidders: Given the valuations v−i of all bidders except bidder i, the menu Rv −i of bidder i, is defined to be all possible bundles that may be allocated to i, that is
We recall the taxation principle: Given valuations v−i, there is a nondecreasing function pv −i : Rv −i → R+ such that the i'th bidder is allocated a set that maximizes vi(S) − pv −i (S) over all the sets in Rv −i and pays pv −i (S). We proceed by applying the Sauer-Shelah Lemma, which provides us with a subset of items X ⊆ [m] of size |X| = Ω m 4 that is shattered by some S(v−i, k, p). The fact that X is shattered by a structured submenu with the same level of prices, allows us to solve a hard computational problem by considering a valuation that relies on these prices. In order to define such valuation, we extend the prices from Rv −i to all subsets of [m]. We do so as follows: Given T ⊂ [m], set pv −i (T ) := minT ⊂S, S∈Rv −i pv −i (S). We will need the following two facts: Lemma 4.7 ([14] ). Let M be an efficient truthful mechanism and let v−i be some valuations with polynomial description. Then membership in S(v−i, k, p) and calculation of (the extended) pv −i can be realized by a circuit of polynomial size.
We can now prove the second part of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma 4.8. No efficient deterministic truthful mechanism provides an approximation ratio of m 1− w.r.t. m -local valuations unless N P ⊆ P/poly.
Our proof of Lemma 4.8 relies on a reduction from VERTEX-COVER: Given a graph whose vertices are the items in the shattered sets, we define the valuation vi such that vi assigns high values to all vertex covers but, through the menu prices, makes covers of size ≥ t unattractive. We then leverage the taxation principle to show that if there is a cover C of size t of U , the mechanism will allocate bidder i a set T such that T ∩ U is a cover of size t.
